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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Federal Income Tax-Net Gift Doctrine-No TAXABLE INCOME
RESULTS FROM GIFT GIVEN SUBJECT TO CONDITION THAT DONEE
PAY GIFT TAX
Hirst v. Commissioner,
572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
Edna Bennett Hirst, an eighty-one year old widow, transfer-
red real property worth approximately $400,000 to her son,
daughter-in-law, and grandchildren.' Unable to afford the result-
ing gift taxes, Mrs. Hirst made the transfers subject to the condi-
tion that her son pay the gift taxes. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue claimed that the transactions resulted in taxable income to
Mrs. Hirst. The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, 2 disagreed, holding
that a donor who gives a gift subject to an agreement that the
donee pay the resulting gift tax realizes no income on the transac-
tion. 3 The court relied on Turner v. Commissioner,4 a case that the
Sixth Circuit had apparently overruled in Johnson v. Commissioner.5
Hirst v. Commissioner' thus perpetuates the confusion in the law
governing this type of transaction.
I
HISTORY OF THE NET GIFT DOCTRINE
Turner v. Commissioner dealt with the income tax consequences7
'Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427, 434-35 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (dissenting
opinion, Thomsen, J.).
2 Originally heard by a three-judge panel, the case was reheard en banc. Id. at 434
(dissenting opinion, Winter and Butzner, JJ.).3 Id. at 431.
449 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969), nonacq. 1971-2
C.B. 4.
5 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
6 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
7 Unlike the income tax consequences, the gift tax consequences of net gifts, or gifts in
which a donor gives a gift subject to an agreement that the donee pay the resulting gift
tax, are well established. Courts have concluded that the net benefit to the donee equals
the value of the gift property less the gift tax due; therefore, only the value of the gift
exceeding the gift tax paid-the amount given with donative intent-is a taxable gift. See
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of a gift to an individual' subject to a condition that the donee pay
the donor's gift tax, a transaction the court labeled a "net gift."9
Pamela Turner owned 70,902 shares of stock having a cost basis
of $3.5203 per share.' 0 She wished to give a portion of this stock
to her children and grandchildren without incurring a crushing
gift tax liability. She transferred 18,980 shares, with a basis of
$66,815.29, in nine separate transfers to three individuals and six
trusts." Each transferee took his portion of the stock subject to an
agreement to pay that part of the donor's gift tax arising from the
transfer. 12
The Commissioner argued that Turner's transfer of stock to
each individual subject to agreement that the recipient pay the
resulting gift tax was "a part sale and part gift" and, as such, re-
sulted in taxable income to the donor.13 In a part sale, part gift
transaction, the seller-donor transfers property to the buyer-donee
in return for payment of an amount less than the market value of
the property transferred.' 4 To the extent that the donee gives con-
Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350, 1357 (1952), acq. 1952-2 C.B. 2. The Internal
Revenue Service has acquiesced in this view and provided a formula to use in calculating
the gift tax due on a net gift. See Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310 (general formula); Rev.
Rul. 76-57, 1976-1 C.B. 297 (formula for North Carolina taxpayers); Rev. Rul. 76-104,
1976-1 C.B. 301 (formula for California taxpayers); Rev. Rul. 76-105, 1976-1 C.B. 304
(formula for Virginia taxpayers).
8This Note is primarily concerned with transfers to individuals. Where appropriate,
the implications for transfers to trusts are noted.
9 49 T.C. at 363.
'ld. at 358.
" See id.
12 The agreement stated, inter alia:
We have further been informed that this gift is being made subject to my
paying the gift tax on same. This letter can be taken as my acceptance of the
proposed condition of the gift, and I agree to accept as my share of the gift tax an
amount which is computed by your tax counsel.
Id. The gift taxes due on the nine transfers totaled $172,424.17. Id. at 359. With respect to
the transfers in trust, a further agreement required that federal gift taxes be paid out of
the corpora of the trusts in equal shares without personal liability on the part of the trus-
tees. Id. at 358.
13 Id. at 357. The issue in the Tax Court centered on the transfers to individuals. The
Commissioner had conceded "that the transfers to the trusts were in no part sales." Id. See
also note 12 supra.
14See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 162 (defining gain to
donor on part sale, part gift); Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4, T.D. 6693, 1963-2 C.B. 326 (donee's
basis after part sale, part gift); cf. I.R.C. § 1011-2(b) (part sale, part gift to charitable or-
ganization). See generally Rogers v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 994 (1935), rev'd, 107 F.2d 394
(2d Cir. 1939), nonacq. 1939-2 C.B. 64 (donee's basis after part sale, part gift); see also
Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953) (gift tax due on part sale, part gift).
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sideration for the transfer of the property, a sale results; to the
extent that the value of the property exceeds the consideration
received, a gift results. In Turner, the Commissioner urged that the
payment of a donor's gift tax by the donee supplies partial con-
sideration for the transfer and renders the transaction a part
sale, part gift. 15 Consequently, the taxpayer realizes gain to the
extent that his gift tax liability exceeds his basis in the property
transferred.16
The Commissioner's argument did not convince the Tax
Court. The court concluded that each transaction was more accu-
rately characterized as a "net gift": a gift of the property less the
amount of gift tax due on the transfer.' 7 The Sixth Circuit agreed
in a per curiam opinion.' 8 Under the net gift characterization, the
'5 49 T.C. at 357. Under I.R.C. § 2502(d), the donor is primarily liable for the gift tax.
I.R.C. § 6324, however, places a lien against the gift property if the tax is not paid on time.
Therefore, the donee may in some cases become liable for payment of the tax. Estate of
Sheaffer v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963), held
that although the donee may become liable for the tax, timely payment by the donee may
result in income to the donor. Id. at 740-41.
16 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 162.
' Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. at 363. In making its determination, the Tax
Court examined a line of cases dealing with the income tax consequences of a transfer to a
trust subject to an agreement by the trustee to pay the donor's gift tax. See Estate of
Morgan v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 825 (1963) (no taxable income to settlor when gift tax paid by borrowing money
against trust corpus and repaying loan from subsequent trust income); Estate of Sheaffer v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 99 (1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818
(1963) (taxable income to donor when gift tax paid from current trust income); Lingo v.
Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954) (gift tax excluded from gross value of net gift
in computing gift tax); Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acq. 1952-2 C.B. 2
(donor may exclude gift taxes from gross value of gift to determine net value of gift sub-
ject to gift tax); Estate of Staley v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 368
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943) (taxable income to donor when he receives fixed
amount of trust income with which to pay gift tax).
These cases interpreted I.R.C. § 677, which provides:
(a) General Rule
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust, whether
or not he is treated as such owner under section 674, whose income without the
approval or consent of any adverse party is, or, in the discretion of the grantor or
a nonadverse party, or both, may be-
(1) distributed to the grantor or the grantor's spouse ....
None of these cases considered whether the transactions constituted part sales, part gifts;
rather, they focused on the degree of interest retained by the settlor where the trust in-
strument provided that the trust would pay the gift tax. Nevertheless, from this treatment
of transfers to trusts, the Tax Court in Turner concluded that a net gift to an individual
was not a part sale, part gift and thus resulted in no taxable income to the donor. 49 T.C.
at 362.
16 Turner v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969), aff'g per curiam 49 T.C. 356
(1968).
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donor had given away the stock, retaining an interest sufficient to
pay the gift tax due on each transfer.19 The Tax Court held that
the donor could retain this interest and direct the donee to use it to
pay the gift tax without the donor realizing any income. 20 The Tax
Court failed to recognize, however, that if the donor had physically
retained a portion of the property, she could not have used that
portion to discharge her gift tax obligation without realizing any
appreciation in the value of the retained portion.21 By neglecting to
carry the analysis to its ultimate conclusion, the Tax Court in
Turner established that net gift transactions are nontaxable events,
even when the donor transfers appreciated property. 22
In Johnson v. Commissioner,23 the Sixth Circuit again confronted
an attempt by a donor to make a gift of property while shifting to
the donee the burden of the gift tax. The taxpayer first obtained a
$200,000 bank loan secured by 50,000 shares of stock.24 He then
established an irrevocable trust with his children as beneficiaries,
and transferred to it his rights in the 50,000 shares of stock.25 The
trustee executed a note to the bank, cancelling Johnson's note and
secured by the 50,000 shares.26 At the close of the transaction, the
19 49 T.C. at 363. To illustrate the "net gift" proposition, the court analogized the
concept to the transaction in Kruesel v. United States, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5701 (D. Minn.
1963). In that case, taxpayers owned farm property and a house. They sold the property to
a corporation for $225,000, reserving for themselves the rent-free occupancy of the house
for their lives plus six months. The court held that the amount realized was $225,000, not
$225,000 plus the rental value of the house for their lives. Id. at 5705.
20 49. T.C. at 363.
21 If the donor had physically divided the property and retained a portion sufficient to
pay the gift tax, she would have had to sell the retained portion, realizing any appreciation
in value over her adjusted basis. See I.R.C. § 1101(a), quoted in part in note 70 infra. In
Turner, where the subject matter of the gift was 18,980 shares of stock, the donor could
easily have retained enough shares to pay the gift tax. A physical division of property may
not be possible, however, when the property is a single entity, such as an apartment house.
See note 90 infra.
22 Turner involved appreciated property: the donor transferred 18,980 shares, each
with a basis of $3.5203, amounting to a total basis of $66,815.29. The gift taxes arising
from the transfer amounted to $172,424.17. 49 T.C. at 358-59. Clearly, the market value
of the shares at the time of transfer greatly exceeded the donor's basis in the shares.
The Commissioner conceded in Turner "that the transfers to the trusts were in no part
sales" (id. at 357), presumably even if I.R.C. § 677 did not apply (see note 17 supra). This
concession forced the Commissioner to argue that the gifts to the individuals could be
distinguished from those to the trusts. The Commissioner failed to persuade the court,
however, that the transfers to individuals should he treated differently from the transfers
to trusts.
23 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
24 1d. at 1080. The stock was worth approximately $500,000 at the time. The note was
without personal liability. Id.
25 Id
.26 1d
.
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trust contained $500,000 worth of stock encumbered by a $200,000
debt. Johnson had $200,000 in cash and no obligation on the note.
He later paid gift taxes of $150,000, leaving him $50,000 in cash. 27
In the Tax Court,28 the taxpayer argued that he had made a
net gift and therefore, under Turner, had no taxable income arising
from the transaction. Yet Johnson had neither conditioned the
transfer on the recipients' payment of the gift tax, nor retained an
interest in the trust corpus. For these reasons and because the loan
proceeds exceeded the gift tax liability by $50,000, the court held
that a net gift had not occurred.29 Instead, the Tax Court found
that Johnson had entered into a part sale, part gift transaction,
resulting in taxable income to the donor.3 0
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's decision, but rejected the part sale, part gift label as con-
clusory and immaterial.3 1 The court discussed two alternative
analyses, based on Crane v. Commissioner3 2 and Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Commissioner.33 In Crane, the Supreme Court held that the in-
crease in net worth resulting from a cancellation of indebtedness is
taxable. 34 Applying Crane, the critical factor in the Johnson transac-
tion was that Johnson had borrowed money using the stock as
collateral before the transfer. As a result, Johnson received some-
thing of value when he transferred the stock-the cancellation of
the $200,000 debt.35 Under Old Colony Trust, on the other hand,
the discharge of a taxpayer's tax liability by a third party is income
to the taxpayer. 36 The Johnson court equated the $150,000 Johnson
used to pay his gift tax with the donee's assumption of that tax.37
271d"
2
sJohnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).2 91d. at 813.
3 01d. at 808.
31 "Whether we describe this substance as a 'part sale and part gift' or a 'net gift' has
no importance." 495 F.2d at 1083. In fact, Johnson looks less like a part sale, part gift
transaction than does Turner. In Johnson, no agreement existed before the transfer that the
donee would pay the gift tax; the donee merely received a smaller gift.
32 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
33 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
34331 U.S. at 14.
35 "Under Crane v. Commissioner... the taxpayer realized income in the amount or
[sic] the debt disposed of, regardless of the fact that he was not personally liable on the
debt." Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d at 1083. This analysis will apply only to those
net gift transactions where the donor borrows money against the gift property to pay the
gift tax.
36 279 U.S. at 729.
37 The donor bears the primary responsibility for the gift tax. See note 15 supra.
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The donor thus realized income in the amount of the gift tax
paid.38
The Johnson court did not choose between these approaches,
finding that, under either analysis, the gain on the transaction was
the amount realized ($150,000 plus $50,000) less Johnson's basis in
the stock ($10,000), or $190,000. 39 Because the gain resulted from
an exchange of a capital asset, the Johnson court held that the
taxpayer was entitled to treat it as a capital gain.40 Thus, although
the court rejected the part sale, part gift label, it arrived at the
same result as had the Tax Court.
Johnson did not expressly overrule Turner, but purported to
confine Turner to its facts. 41 Commentators nevertheless viewed
Johnson as an abrupt departure from the established treatment of
net gifts. 42 Furthermore, because the characterization of the trans-
action in Johnson differed so greatly from that in Turner, Johnson
appeared to have completely rejected both the analysis and the
outcome of Turner.
II
HIRST V. COMMISSIONER
The net gift problem resurfaced in Hirst v. Commissioner.43 The
facts of Hirst resembled those of Turner.44 The parent taxpayer
(Mrs. Hirst) gave her interest in three tracts of unimproved land 45
"The amount realized would not be ordinary income as in Old Colony Trust, but a
benefit to the taxpayer that must be construed in the context of the transaction-in the
Johnson case, an exchange of a capital asset.
39 495 F.2d at 1084.
41 Id. The court found that the gain resulted "from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset held for more than 6 months." I.R.C. § 1222(3) (amended 1976).
41 See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d at 1086.
42 See, e.g., Note, Bad News For Net Givers: Donee Payment of Gift Taxes Results in Taxable
Income to Donor, 36 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 517 (1974). See generally Net Gifts-A Critical Look at
Johnson v. Commissioner, TAX MNGM'T MEM. (BNA) No. 75-05, Mar. 3, 1975, at 2.
43 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
44 See id. at 433 (dissenting opinion, Bryan, J.), 437 (dissenting opinion, Thomsen, J.);
text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
45 Mrs. Hirst owned a one-half interest in three tracts of land; the other half interest in
the land was in the donor's husband's estate. The fair market value of the donor's one-half
interest greatly exceeded her basis:
Donor's Adjusted Basis Fair Market Value
Tract 1 $4,654 $291,832.50
Tract 2 3,723 119,404.50
Tract 3 0 33,351.50
572 F.2d at 435 (dissenting opinion, Thomsen, J.).
1978] 1079
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1074
to her son, his wife, and their children. As part of the transaction,
the son agreed to assume Mrs. Hirst's gift tax liability. She calcu-
lated the worth of the net gifts by reducing the value of the trans-
ferred properties by the amount of gift tax liability on the trans-
fers.4 6 Her son paid gift taxes on the net gifts; the gifts totalled$359,118. 4
The Tax Court 48 found that a realistic solution to the problem
in Hirst would require the imposition of income taxes on Mrs.
Hirst. 49 The court noted that
[i]n substance, a portion of the transferred property equal in
value to the amount of the gift tax is not treated as having been
part of the gift. But surely that portion did not vanish into thin
air, and a strong argument can be advanced for the conclusion
that it was exchanged for the donee's payment of the gift tax on
the "net gift" . ... 50
Nonetheless, the Tax Court felt constrained by the holding in
Turner due to the factual similarity of the two cases, and held that
Mrs. Hirst was not liable for income taxes on the transaction. 5 1
Initially, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit disagreed,52 finding that the transaction did result in taxable
gain to Mrs. Hirst. 53 The panel majority reasoned that under Old
Colony Trust,
[t]he discharge of a solvent taxpayer's liability is ordinarily
regarded as conferring a benefit which may result in income to
the taxpayer .... The effect of what was done in this case is the
same as though the son had paid the money directly to taxpayer
and she had used it to discharge her gift tax liabilities. 54
41 "Recognizing that the net amount of gifts and the gift tax itself are mutually depen-
dent variables, taxpayer computed the gift tax in accordance with a formula that was sub-
stantially the same as the formula subsequently adopted for use in such situations .... Id.
at 435 n.1.
4
"Id. at 435.
4 Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307 (1974), aff'd en banc, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.
1978).49 1d. at 315.
50 Id.
5' "[Iln the absence of any clear-cut overruling of prior law by a Court of Appeals, we
are not prepared at this time to reexamine an intricate and consistent pattern of decision
that has evolved over the years in this field .... Id.
5' Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d at 434-40 (dissenting opinion, Thomsen, J.). After
the Hirst rehearing, Judge Thomsen's panel majority opinion became a dissenting opinion
from the en banc majority opinion.
5
"Id. at 439-40.
54id. at 438.
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The court concluded that the payment of the gift taxes was partial
consideration for the transfer of the property to the donee, and
that Mrs. Hirst therefore realized a capital gain in the amount by
which the gift taxes paid exceeded her basis in the property.55
Before the court filed its opinions, however, the Fourth Circuit
reheard the Hirst case, this time sitting en banc.5 6 On rehearing,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision. 57 The majority
opinion, written by Chief Judge Haynsworth, relied heavily on
Turner58 and distinguishedJohnson. 59 The majority opinion did not,
however, scrutinize Turner's rationale. 60 The court merely found
the case before it factually identical t~o Turner; Johnson's limitation
of Turner to its facts thus did not impede reliance upon the earlier
case.
61
The Fourth Circuit justified its holding in Hirst by emphasizing
that the transaction was not a sale. 6' The taxpayer did not receive
anything of value as a result of the transaction: "[T]here was no
economic gain of any kind accruing to her, except release from the
normal tax burden of an owner of real estate. ' 63 The court denied
that Old Colony Trust6 4 compelled a finding that some benefit ac-
crued to Mrs. Hirst from the payment of her gift taxes: "[I]t is no
doubt generally true that another's discharge of an obligation is
productive of income, but that is not universally the case.1 65 Judge
Haynsworth did not explain the characteristics of those transac-
tions to which Old Colony Trust does not apply. His limited explana-
tion suggests, however, that the payment of the gift taxes by Mrs.
Hirst's son should be viewed as a gift from the son to Mrs. Hirst. 66
The evidence does not support this analysis: 67 the payment of the
55 "In substance, taxpayer received the amount of the gift taxes in exchange for the
transfer of the properties." Id. at 439.
56 See id. at 434 (dissenting opinion, Winter and Butzner, JJ.).
57 Id. at 431 (majority opinion).
5 See text accompanying notes 7-22 supra.
'9 See 572 F.2d at 428-31; text accompanying notes 23-42 supra.
60 See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
61 See 572 F.2d at 430.
62 "The predominant circumstance here is that this taxpayer did not intend to sell
anything; she intended only to give her property to her progeny." Id.
63 Id.
"
4 See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
65 572 F.2d at 431.
66 "For example, where a son has borrowed from a bank and his father pays off the
son's loan without discharging any obligation to the son, the payment is not taxable income
to the son, but a gift." Id.
6 7 Judge Thomsen noted: "Taxpayer's argument that the payment of the taxes was a
1978] 1081
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gift taxes was not spontaneous, but was instead a condition of the
receipt of the gift. 68
Judge Haynsworth noted that Mrs. Hirst was not better off
after the transaction than before, 69 implying that she therefore
received no income as a result of the transaction. That the taxpayer
is not better off after a transaction does not necessarily imply,
however, that the transaction generated no taxable income. For
example, in an arms-length sale of appreciated property, a tax-
payer may receive as consideration an amount equal to the fair
market value of the property transferred. In strict economic terms,
he is not better off after the transaction; yet clearly the taxpayer
has taxable income arising from the transaction.7 0 Because the Hirst
court employed the "gift" paradigm, it failed to recognize the
transaction as an appropriate event through which to tax the ap-
preciation in the gift property.71
III
SHOULD NET GIFrs RESULT IN TAXABLE INCOME?
A. The Argument for Taxation of Net Gifts of Appreciated Property
The courts that have considered the income tax aspects of net
gifts to individuals7 2 have failed to confront the major issue in-
volved: whether and to what extent the donor must realize ap-
preciation of net gift property.7 3 The following three variations on
the facts of Hirst help to isolate the problem and suggest possible
solutions.
gift back to her is not supported by the facts stipulated by the parties and testified to by
the son." Id. at 439 n.6 (dissenting opinion).
68 "All of the transfers were subject to the condition that [the son and daughter-in-law]
pay the applicable gift taxes." Id. at 435 (dissenting opinion, Thomsen, J.).
:9 Id. at 431 (majority opinion).
70 Section 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "The gain from the sale or
other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the
adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain ...." If, as stipulated, the
property has appreciated, its fair market value (the amount realized) will exceed its basis
and give rise to income taxable under I.R.C. § 1001(c).
In addition, although Mrs. Hirst did not "better" her position, she was better off than
if she had transferred the property but paid the gift taxes herself.
71 See text accompanying notes 95-96 infra.
72 See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040
(1974); Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), affd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th
Cir. 1969), nonacq. 1971-2 C.B. 4.
73Johnson dealt only tangentially with this issue. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495
F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
1082 [Vol. 63:1074
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Cash: Donor A makes a net gift equal to $400,000 in cash.
DonorA's objective is clear: he wants the value of the gift property
minus the burden of the gift tax to total $400,000.74 Donor B
might structure the transaction differently, retaining an amount
sufficient to discharge the gift tax obligation and transferring the
remainder to the donee. The gift tax consequences of these two
transactions are identical. Under the net'gift theory of gift taxation,
only the value of Donor A's gift that exceeds the gift tax paid by the
donee is a taxable gift.75 Donor A is thus in the same position as
Donor B who withheld the amount necessary to discharge his gift
tax liability.
On the income tax side, Donor B has no taxable income as a
result of his transfer;7 6 nor should Donor A. Two reasons argue
against Donor A incurring income tax liability even though his
donee paid the gift tax. First, the two transactions are essentially
the same,7 7 and similarly situated taxpayers should experience simi-
lar income tax consequences.7 8 Second, nontaxation of Donor A
comports with the approach courts have adopted in determining
the gift tax consequences of such a transaction: the donor who
makes a net gift is treated as if he had retained a portion of the
property with which to pay his gift tax. 79 The suggested approach
thus results in consistency between the gift tax and income tax
systems.80
74 Frequently, as in the Hirst case, the donor makes a net gift because he lacks the
liquid assets necessary to pay the gift tax. See Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427, 435
(4th Cir. 1978) (en banc).7 5 See note 7 supra.
7 6 See I.R.C. § 1001(a), quoted in part in note 70 supra. The donor's basis in the cash is
equal to its face value; the amount realized minus the donor's basis is, therefore, zero.
77 Both taxpayers want to make a gift of property without incurring a gift tax liability
that they must pay with other assets. At the end of the transactions, neither taxpayer has
property left, and their gift tax liability is the same. See note 7 supra.
7 See United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1960) (concurring opinion,
Frankfurter, J.) ('The Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax another without some
rational basis for the difference."); IBM v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 923 (Ct. CL. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966) (equality of treatment central to administration of I.R.C.
§ 7805(b)).
If taxpayers entering similar transactions are treated differently, the obvious result is
to penalize those without adequate tax counsel.
7' See Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350, 1356 (1952), acq. 1952-2 C.B. 2:
We are now called upon for the first time to decide whether the value of that gift
tax as a retained interest by the donor may be excluded from the gross value of
the gifts in determining the net value of the gift subject to gift tax.... [W]e hold
that the amount of the gift tax may be excluded, as a retained interest, from the
gross value of the gifts in determining the net value.
10 Although courts have not interpreted the gift tax and income tax provisions in pari
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Unappreciated Property: Donor C transfers eighty lots subject to
the condition that the donee pay the gift tax. Each lot has a basis of
$5,000 and a fair market value of $5,000. To achieve the same
result, Donor D transfers sixty-three lots and retains seventeen,
which he sells to pay his gift tax. 81 Both donors incur equal gift tax
liabilities.8 2 Donor D has no taxable income from the transaction
because the amount he realizes less his basis is zero. 83 Donor C
should have no taxable income either: similarly situated taxpayers
should have similar tax burdens, 84 and the income tax and gift
tax systems should be administered consistently whenever such
administration does not conflict with the policies behind the
statutes.
85
Appreciated Property: Donor E makes a net gift of eighty lots,
each having a basis of $100 and a fair market value of $5,000.
Donor F transfers sixty-three lots and retains seventeen, which he
sells to pay his gift tax.8 6 Under the net gift theory, the two donors
incur the same gift tax liability on gifts valued at $315,000.87 Donor
F has sold seventeen lots, each with a basis of $100 and a fair
market value of $5,000, giving him a capital gain of $83,300.88
Should Donor E have taxable income arising from his transfer of
the eighty lots? Again, the motivations of and nontax consequences
to the donors are the same.8 9 They should, therefore, incur similar
income tax liabilities: Donor E should be taxed on the appreciation
materia (see Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947); Note, supra
note 42, at 532), both tax systems share a concern for concentrating on the substance of a
transaction rather than on its form (see, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S.
331, 334 (1945) (income tax); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (income tax);
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 287 (1933) (gift tax)).
"' These figures assume that the gift tax liability is $85,000, exactly the amount raised
by selling the retained lots.
s
2 See note 7 supra.
8 3 See I.R.C. § 1001 (a), quoted in part in note 70 supra.
8 4 See note 78 supra.
8 5 See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
86 These figures assume that the gift tax liability is $85,000, exactly the amount raised
by selling the retained lots.8 7 See note 7 supra.
88 Donor F realizes $85,000. Subtracting his basis of $1,700 in the 17 lots, he has a
gain of $83,300 on the transaction. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), quoted in part in note 70 supra.
Under I.R.C. § 1221, the gain is a capital gain if it results from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset. The property transferred is a capital asset unless it was, for example, "held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or busi-
ness." I.R.C. § 1221 (1). Assuming a capital gain, Donor F may deduct $41,650 under I.R.C.
§ 1202 or use the alternative capital gains provisions of I.R.C. § 1201(b) to compute his
taxable income.
8 See note 77 supra.
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of the property.90 By reducing the transaction to its substance, as
courts have attempted to do, 9' one sees that DonorE has retained a
portion of the gift which he uses to pay his gift tax. Where the
property has increased in value, he realizes this appreciation to the
extent that he uses a portion of the property to discharge his gift
tax liability. Donor E should, therefore, recognize this benefit as
income in the year of the gift.92
As the preceding paragraph indicates, the basic tax policies of
horizontal equity93 and substance over form94 suggest that the tax-
payer who makes a net gift of appreciated property should recognize
that portion of the appreciation from which he benefits. One might
argue that the recognition of appreciation should be deferred be-
cause taxpayers who make outright gifts of appreciated assets need
not recognize any appreciation at the time of the gift-giving.95 In
those cases, recognition of appreciation is postponed until the donee
disposes of the asset (other than by another gift).96 Congress has,
however, refused to extend this treatment to cases where the donor
receives partial consideration for the transfer 97 or where the donor
uses a portion of the appreciated property to pay his gift tax.98
Another possible objection to the taxation of appreciation at
the time of the net gift is that it may prevent certain taxpayers
from transferring appreciated property.99 The court of appeals
90 See notes 78 & 80 supra. If the property transferred is indivisible, then the taxpayer
cannot sell a portion to raise money for the gift tax. However, distinctions should not be
drawn based on whether the gift property is divisible. To do so would introduce further
inequities in the administration of the tax laws. The donor of indivisible property has no
alternative but to make a net gift if he wants the donee to pay the gift tax. Nontaxation
would thus penalize those donors of divisible property who make an uninformed decision
to retain a portion of the gift property to pay the gift tax.
91 See Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th
Cir. 1969), -nonacq. 1971-2 C.B. 4; Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350, 1352 (1952),
acq. 1952-2 C.B. 2; note 79 supra.
92 See note 21 supra.
" See note 78 supra.
" See note 80 supra.
9' See I.R.C. § 1015 (donee's basis for determining gain equal to donor's basis plus gift
tax paid but not exceeding market value).
96 See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), 1015. If the donee sells the property he will have a gain under
§ 1001(a). If he gives the property away, the new donee's basis will be determined under
§ 1015.
9
'See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 162, quoted in part in
note 114 infra.
9 8 See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040
(1974); I.R.C. § 1001(a); note 21 and accompanying text supra.
99 If a donor has insufficient liquid assets with which to pay the gift tax on a transfer,
he might also have insufficient funds with which to pay the tax on appreciation. See note
100 infra.
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noted in Johnson that such taxation would not impose hardship on
most taxpayers. 100 These objections to taxation of appreciation at
the time of a net gift do not outweigh the benefits achieved in the
form of equal and fair administration of the income tax system.
B. How Much Taxable Income?
Given that a net gift of appreciated property results in taxable
income, under what theory should the tax be imposed and how
should the amount of taxable income be ascertained? Each of sev-
eral theories supporting taxation leads to a different amount of
taxable income. The following analysis of the two most viable
theories'' proceeds from a simplification of the facts of Hirst: the
donor gives property with a basis of $5,000 and a fair market value
of $400,000 to his donee; the gift tax liability (computed in accord-
ance with the net gift formula'0 2) is $85,000.0 3
The retained interest theory'0 4 would treat the donor as if he
had withheld an interest in the property and directed the donee
to use that interest to discharge the gift tax liability.' 0 5 The donor
then recognizes any gain or loss on the disposition of the retained
interest.'06 The donor's basis in the retained interest is that amount
100 See 495 F.2d at 1084-85. The Johnson court suggested that the donor could require
the donees to pay the gift tax and the capital gains tax. Id. at 1085 n.11. This would
complicate matters because the payment of the capital gains tax would itself give rise to
more capital gains tax. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729
(1929). This problem is not insoluble-a formula could be devised to determine the gift
and capital gains taxes due on such a transaction.
101 Two other approaches may be dismissed without detailed discussion. First, a strict
reading of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), leads to the taxa-
tion, as ordinary income, of the full amount paid by the donee to discharge the gift tax.
Under this approach, the transfer of property to the donee is a gift and the payment of
the donor's gift tax discharges the donor's obligation. This gives rise to ordinary income.
As the Johnson court recognized, however, the transfer of property and the payment of the
gift tax should not be treated as two distinct transactions, but rather as a single transaction
involving an exchange of a capital asset. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079,
1084 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974). Second, a gift-gift analysis treats the
transaction as a gift of property to the donee and a gift back to the donor of the amount
of the gift tax paid. This approach is difficult to reconcile with the facts of most net gift
cases, in which the payment of the donor's gift tax is bargained for by the donor. See
Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 358 (1968), affd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.
1969), nonacq. 1971-2 C.B. 4; note 67 supra.
10 2 See note 7 supra.
103 See note 8 supra.
10 4 See Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 362 (1968), affd per curiam, 410 F.2d
752 (6th Cir. 1969), nonacq. 1971-2 C.B. 4; Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350, 1356
(1952), acq. 1952-2 C.B. 2; notes 19 & 21 and accompanying text supra.
"'5 See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
106 In effect, the donor sells the retained interest to the donee in return for payment
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bearing the same relation to the entire basis as the amount realized
(the amount of the gift tax) bears to the fair market value of the
property.' 07 The total gain equals the amount realized on the
donor's disposition of his retained interest ($85,000) less the
donor's basis in the retained interest ($1,062.50).108 Because this is
a sale or exchange of a capital asset,10 9 the donor may utilize the
capital gains deduction; his taxable income from the transaction
would then be $41,968.75.110 This analysis is consistent with the
gift tax view of the transaction"' and treats equally the net gift
giver and the donor who retains property to pay his gift tax."i2
Furthermore, it conforms to the donor's intention in framing the
transaction, namely, to have the gift tax burden discharged from
the corpus of the gift rather than from the donor's other assets." 3
Alternatively, under the part sale, part gift theory, the donor
sells the property to the donee for less than its fair market value," 4
of the donor's gift tax. The donor must recognize any gain from the sale. See I.R.C.
§ 1001.
107 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957) reads in part:
When a part of a larger property is sold, the cost or other basis of the entire
property shall be equitably apportioned among the several parts, and the gain
realized or loss sustained on the part of the entire property sold is the difference
between the selling price and the cost or other basis allocated to such part.
See generally Welsh Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 391, 395 (4th Cir. 1960) (alloca-
tion among separate parcels of land); Hunter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 109 (1965) (alloca-
tion between retained life interest and remainder).
The donor's basis is that amount (X) that bears the same relation to the entire basis
($5,000) as the value of the retained interest ($85,000) bears to the fair market value of the
property ($400,000).
X 85,0005,000 ,000 X = $1,062.50
108 See I.R.C. § 1001(a), quoted in part in note 70 supra.
' See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1040 (1974); I.R.C. § 1221 (defining capital asset); note 88 supra.
110 The taxpayer's gain is $85,000 minus $1,062.50, or $83,937.50. If the gain is capital
(see I.R.C. § 1222 (defining capital gain)), then the taxpayer may deduct 50% of the gain,
leaving taxable income of $41,968.75 (see I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (deduction for capital gain)).
See note 88 supra.
"I See note 7 supra.
112 If the property is indivisible, the donor will not have that alternative. See notes 21 &
90 supra.
113 See note 74 supra.
114 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 162, provides in part:
Where a transfer of property is in part a sale and in part a gift, the transferor has
a gain to the extent that the amount realized by him exceeds his adjusted basis in
the property. However, no loss is sustained on such a transfer if the amount
realized is less than the adjusted basis.
See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
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receiving as consideration the discharge of his gift tax." 5 The gain
on the transaction equals the donor's gift tax liability less his basis
in the entire property." 6 The donor's taxable income is then
$40,000.17 The part sale, part gift characterization has two draw-
backs. First, it does not accurately reflect the donor's primary moti-
vation in making the transfer: to make a gift of the property.'
Second, the tax consequences under this view differ from those
resulting from alternative ways of achieving the same goal."19 If the
donor retains a portion of the property which he then sells to pay
the gift tax, he cannot offset his entire basis in the property trans-
ferred against the amount realized on the sale.12 0
The retained interest theory is the most attractive. Under it, a
net gift giver encounters the same income tax liability as a donor
who physically divides the property and sells a portion of it to pay
his gift tax.'12  The part sale, part gift theory, on the other hand,
may treat unequally taxpayers who happen to structure their trans-
actions differently. 22 The retained interest result also conforms to
115 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
16 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 162, quoted in part in
note 114 supra. Arguably, a donor making a part sale, part gift should allocate his basis as
when making a bargain sale to a charity under I.R.C. § 1011(b). See Note, supra note 42, at
533-36. The authorities have, however, foreclosed this argument. See Finicke v. Commis-
sioner, 39 B.T.A. 510 (1939), acq. 1939-2 C.B. 193 (taxpayer has gain of amount realized
less entire adjusted basis in property transferred); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7207,
1972-2 C.B. 106, 162, quoted in part in note 114 supra; Letter Ruling 7752001, at 10, IRS
LETTER RULINGS REP. (CCH) (Dec. 30, 1977).
"" The gift tax liability ($85,000) less the basis ($5,000) is $80,000. Because this is a
capital gain (see I.R.C. § 1222; note 88 supra), the taxpayer may deduct one-half under
I.R.C. § 1202.
11 See note 62 supra; text accompanying note 124 infra.
"'But see note 90 and accompanying text supra.
:20 See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
21 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957), quoted in part in note 107 supra; note 88 and
accompanying text supra. To determine taxable gain under the basis allocation provisions
of Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a), the donor would allocate the same proportion of the basis to a
portion of the property physically retained as to a portion in which he had retained an
interest. The amount realized (the gift tax paid) is also the same in both cases. (This
analysis assumes that a donor may physically retain a portion whose fair market value
equals the gift tax liability on the property transferred.) Under I.R.C. § 1101(a), the same
gain will result from both transactions because both taxpayers realize the same amount and
have the same basis.
122 The consequences to the taxpayer under the part sale, part gift theory and the
retained interest theory roughly coincide, but do differ in important respects. If the gift tax
paid exceeds the donor's adjusted basis in the property transferred, then the donor will
have gain under both theories. The gain under the retained interest theory will, however,
exceed the gain under the part sale, part gift theory. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D.
7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 162, quoted in part in note 114 supra; text accompanying notes
104-13 supra.
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what the gift tax cases regard as the substance of the transaction. 123
In addition, the retained interest theory articulates the intent of the
parties. The donor does not want to sell his property to the donee,
he merely wants to make a gift on condition that the donee dis-
charge the resulting gift tax. 1 24
The Internal Revenue Service has consistently maintained that
net gift transactions are part sales, part gifts. 125 Because the Ser-
vice's position results in less taxable income than the retained in-
terest theory, 126 courts are unlikely to adopt the retained interest
analysis. Although the part sale, part gift treatment does not treat
even-handedly taxpayers who choose different ways to structure
their transactions, 127 it comes closer to doing so than does Hirst and
is therefore a more desirable approach.
What would be the impact on taxpayers if the courts accepted
the part sale, part gift theory? 128 For a taxpayer to realize income
on a net gift, his gift tax liability must exceed his basis in the
property.12 9 Consequently, the property must have appreciated
substantially before the taxpayer need worry about income tax lia-
bility from a net gift. In addition, the capital gains tax imposed 130
will not be very large. The most the taxpayer will be required to
pay on a gift not in excess of $2,000,000 is thirty-five percent of the
gift tax liability or approximately fourteen percent of the fair mar-
If the gift tax paid exceeds the allocated basis as computed by Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a)
(1957) (see note 107 supra), but is less than the donor's adjusted basis in the property, then
the donor will experience a gain under the retained interest theory but no gain or loss
under the part sale, part gift theory. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2
C.B. 106, 162, quoted in part in note 114 supra; text accompanying notes 104-13 supra.
If the gift tax paid is less than the donor's allocated basis under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
6(a), then the donor will have a loss under the retained interest theory but no loss or gain
under the part sale, part gift theory. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2
C.B. 106, 162, quoted in part in note 114 supra; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957); text accom-
panying notes 104-13 supra.
123 See, e.g., Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350, 1353 (1952), acq. 1952-2 C.B. 2,
discussed in note 79 supra.
"
4 See note 77 supra.
125 See Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. - [1978] TAX CT. REp. (CCH)
Dec. 34,960 (Feb. 6, 1978); Letter Ruling 7752001, supra note 116.
126 See note 122 supra.
121See note 122 supra.
128 For general discussions of the usefulness of net gifts under the part sale, part gift
theory, see Lowenstein, Federal Tax Implications of Gifts Net of Gift Tax, 50 TAXEs 525,
528-29 (1972); Net Gifts-A Critical Look at Johnson v. Commissioner, TAX MNGM'T MEM., supra
note 42, at 5-7.
129See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 162, quoted in part in
note 114 supra.
130 See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
1978] 1089
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ket value of the gift.131 Furthermore, the taxpayer who is con-
cerned about paying income tax on a net gift may insist that the
donee pay the income tax as well as the gift tax arising from the
transaction. 13
2
CONCLUSION
In Hirst v. Commissioner, the Fourth Circuit confronted two
ostensibly conflicting Sixth Circuit cases: Turner v. Commissioner and
Johnson v. Commissioner. The court, following Turner, held that no
taxable income arose from a donor's transfer of appreciated prop-
erty subject to an agreement that the donee pay the gift tax. In
reaching this result, the Fourth Circuit mischaracterized the true
intent of the parties and perpetuated inconsistencies in the treat-
ment of similarly situated taxpayers. The Hirst court failed to
realize that Turner's retained interest rationale, taken to its logical
conclusion, results in the taxation of appreciated net gift property.
By following Turner without distilling and reapplying the income
tax principles involved, the court not only reached the wrong result
but shrouded the net gift issue with confusion that will prove dif-
ficult to dispel.
Diane Currier Ryan
131 The maximum marginal rate of gift taxation is currently 45% on a gift not in
excess of $2,000,000. I.R.C. §§ 2001(c), 2502(a). For example, if the donor gives one gift
with a fair market value of $2,000,000, his gift tax is $555,800 on the first $1,500,000, plus
45% ($225,000) on the margin. I.R.C. § 2001(c). If the donor's basis in the property is zero
then he will have a capital gain in the amount of the gift tax paid by the donee, or approx-
imately 39% of the fair market value of the gift. The maximum marginal rate of taxation
on capital gains is 35%. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 1202. The largest income tax the donor would ever
have to pay on a net gift of property worth $2,000,000 is approximately 14% of the fair
market value of the gift. This maximum figure would only be reached, however, where the
donor had enough income from other sources to bring the whole of the net gift income
within the maximum marginal rate of capital gains taxation. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 1202.
132 See note 100 supra.
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